Epistemic and non‐Epistemic Theories of Remembering. (4th April 2016)

• Record Type: Journal Article
• Authors: James, Steven
• Is Part Of: Pacific philosophical quarterly. Volume 98(2017)Supplement 1
• Page Start: 109
• Page End: 127
• Publication Date: 2016-04-04
• Subjects: Philosophy -- Periodicals; 105
• DOI: 10.1111/papq.12157
• Languages: English
• ISSNs: 0279-0750

Abstract

Abstract: Contemporary memory sciences describe processes that are dynamic and constructive. This has led some philosophers to weaken the relationship between memory and epistemology; though remembering can give rise to epistemic success, it is not itself an epistemic success state. I argue that non‐epistemic (causal) theories will not do; they provide neither necessary nor sufficient conditions for remembering that p . I also argue that the shortcomings of the causal theory are epistemic in nature. Consequently, a theory of remembering must account for both its fundamentally epistemic nature and for its constructive and dynamic processes.