Evading the Patronage Trap: Organizational Capacity and Demand Making in Mexico. (November 2019)

• Record Type: Journal Article
• Authors: Palmer-Rubin, Brian
• Is Part Of: Comparative political studies. Volume 52:Number 13/14(2019)
• Page Start: 2097
• Page End: 2134
• Publication Date: 2019-11
• Subjects: economic policy -- Mexico -- corruption and patronage -- interest organizations; Political science -- Periodicals; 320.05
• DOI: 10.1177/0010414019830745
• Languages: English
• ISSNs: 0010-4140

Abstract

When do organizations broadly represent the interests of their economic sectors and when do they narrowly represent the interests of members? This article investigates how agricultural and small-business organizations in Mexico make demands for programmatic policies or patronage benefits. Contrary to explanations based on the class of members, I show that the source of organizational capacity shapes demand-making strategies. Organizations that generate selective benefits internally are able to engage in programmatic policies that shape sectoral competitiveness, whereas organizations that fail to solve membership challenges internally are vulnerable to the patronage trap, a self-reproducing cycle wherein they become specialized in demand making for discretionary private goods. I generate this argument through process tracing of two agricultural organizations in Mexico. Analysis of an original survey of economic interest organizations provides broader evidence that organizational capacity is a better predictor of policy demands than social class.