Is Color Experience Cognitively Penetrable?. (31st October 2016)

• Record Type: Journal Article
• Authors: Brogaard, Berit; Gatzia, Dimitria E.
• Is Part Of: Topics in cognitive science. Volume 9:Number 1(2017:Jan.)
• Page Start: 193
• Page End: 214
• Publication Date: 2016-10-31
• Subjects: Cognitive penetrability -- Color experience -- Perceptual modularity -- Post‐perceptual processes -- Phenomenal dogmatism -- Epistemic appearances; Cognitive science -- Periodicals; Cognitive Science -- Periodicals; 153.05
• DOI: 10.1111/tops.12221
• Languages: English
• ISSNs: 1756-8757

Abstract

Abstract: Is color experience cognitively penetrable? Some philosophers have recently argued that it is. In this paper, we take issue with the claim that color experience is cognitively penetrable. We argue that the notion of cognitive penetration that has recently dominated the literature is flawed since it fails to distinguish between the modulation of perceptual content by non‐perceptual principles and genuine cognitive penetration. We use this distinction to show that studies suggesting that color experience can be modulated by factors of the cognitive system do not establish that color experience is cognitively penetrable. Additionally, we argue that even if color experience turns out to be modulated by color‐related beliefs and knowledge beyond non‐perceptual principles, it does not follow that color experience is cognitively penetrable since the experiences of determinate hues involve post‐perceptual processes. We conclude with a brief discussion of the implications that these ideas may have on debates in philosophy. Abstract : Brogaard and Gatzia argue that the notion of cognitive penetration that has recently dominated the literature is flawed since it fails to distinguish between the modulation of perceptual content by non‐perceptual principles and genuine cognitive penetration. Additionally, they argue that even if color experience turns out to be cognitively influenced, this may not have the consequence commonly assumed it has, as experiences of determinate hues may be the result of high‐level cognitive processing.