Price Discrimination in Dynamic Cournot Competition. (25th June 2019)

• Record Type: Journal Article
• Authors: Zhang, Wei-li; Song, Qi-Qing; Jiang, Yi-Rong
• Other Names: López Miguel Ángel Academic Editor.
• Is Part Of: Discrete dynamics in nature and society. Volume 2019(2019)
• Publication Date: 2019-06-25
• Subjects: System analysis -- Periodicals; Dynamics -- Periodicals; Chaotic behavior in systems -- Periodicals; Differentiable dynamical systems -- Periodicals; 003.05
• DOI: 10.1155/2019/9231582
• Languages: English
• ISSNs: 1026-0226

Abstract

Abstract : This paper introduces a new Cournot duopoly game and gives an applied study for price discrimination in a market by dynamic methods. One of two oligopolies has two different prices for a homogeneous product, while the other charges one kind of price. It is found that there is only one stable equilibrium for the discrete dynamic system, and a corresponding stable condition is given. Using a discriminative price is not always beneficial to a firm in equilibrium. If both oligopolies carry out price discrimination, the market's average price is lower than when only one oligopoly does it. The results are verified by numerical simulations.