The logic of delegation and institutional contexts: Ministerial selection under mixed-member systems in Japan. Issue 4 (December 2019)

• Record Type: Journal Article
• Authors: Kubo, Hiroki
• Is Part Of: Asian journal of comparative politics. Volume 4:Issue 4(2019)
• Page Start: 303
• Page End: 329
• Publication Date: 2019-12
• Subjects: bicameralism -- cabinet portfolio allocation -- candidate-centered electoral systems -- intra-party politics -- minister selection; Comparative government -- Periodicals; Asia -- Politics and government -- Periodicals; 320.3095
• DOI: 10.1177/2057891118811686
• Languages: English
• ISSNs: 2057-892X

Abstract

How do electoral systems and legislative institutions modify the logic of delegation in ministerial selection processes? This study argues that candidate-centered electoral systems and bicameralism increase the risk of agency loss. I reveal how these two institutional contexts mediate party leaders' strategies on the allocation of ministerial posts by analyzing Japan's ministerial-selection data and survey-based ideal point estimates from 2003 to 2014. The empirical results indicate that, under the party-centered electoral systems of the lower house, individuals' ideological proximity to the party leadership increases the probability of their joining a cabinet. However, party leaders allocate cabinet posts to ideological outliers in the upper house and also select MPs who are ideologically distant from the party leadership under the candidate-centered electoral systems in order to maintain party unity.