Mixed duopoly: Differential game approach. (30th April 2019)

• Record Type: Journal Article
• Authors: Futagami, Koichi; Matsumura, Toshihiro; Takao, Kizuku
• Is Part Of: Journal of public economic theory. Volume 21:Number 4(2019)
• Page Start: 771
• Page End: 793
• Publication Date: 2019-04-30
• Subjects: Economic policy -- Periodicals; Finance, Public -- Periodicals; 338.9005
• DOI: 10.1111/jpet.12372
• Languages: English
• ISSNs: 1097-3923

Abstract

Abstract : This study formulates a dynamic mixed oligopoly model, in which a state‐owned public firm competes against a private firm over multiple periods. We adopt a differential game formulated by Fershtman and Kamien [Econometrica 55 (1987), pp. 1151–1164] and investigate how the dynamic competition affects the optimal privatization policy. We characterize the open‐loop Nash equilibrium (OLNE) and Markov‐perfect Nash equilibrium (MPNE). We show that in the MPNE, an increase in the degree of privatization has a nonmonotonic effect on the price, increasing it in a wide range of parameter spaces, which is in sharp contrast to the result in the OLNE or static analyses. We also find that the optimal degree of privatization is higher in the MPNE than that in the OLNE and static equilibrium. These results suggest that intertemporal strategic behavior changes the optimal privatization policy.