Explaining Evidence Denial as Motivated Pragmatically Rational Epistemic Irrationality. (4th July 2019)

• Record Type: Journal Article
• Authors: Shaffer, Michael J.
• Is Part Of: Metaphilosophy. Volume 50:Number 4(2019)
• Page Start: 563
• Page End: 579
• Publication Date: 2019-07-04
• Subjects: evidence -- rationality -- pragmatic rationality -- epistemic rationality; Philosophy -- Periodicals; 105
• DOI: 10.1111/meta.12382
• Languages: English
• ISSNs: 0026-1068

Abstract

Abstract: This paper introduces a model for evidence denial that explains this behavior as a manifestation of rationality, and it is based on the contention that social values (measurable as utilities) often underwrite these sorts of responses. Moreover, it contends that the value associated with group membership in particular can override epistemic reason when the expected utility of a belief or belief system is great. It is also true, however, that it appears to be the case that it is still possible for such unreasonable believers to reverse this sort of dogmatism and to change their beliefs in a way that is epistemically rational. The conjecture made here is that we should expect this to happen only when the expected utility of the beliefs in question dips below a threshold where the utility value of continued dogmatism and the associated group membership is no longer sufficient to motivate defusing the counterevidence that tells against such epistemically irrational beliefs.