Bidding for Firms with Unknown Characteristics1. (27th March 2019)

• Record Type: Journal Article
• Authors: Becker, Johannes; Schneider, Andrea
• Is Part Of: Scandinavian journal of economics. Volume 121:Number 3(2019)
• Page Start: 1222
• Page End: 1243
• Publication Date: 2019-03-27
• Subjects: Business taxation -- incomplete information -- mechanism design -- state aids -- subsidy competition; Economics -- Periodicals; 330.05
• DOI: 10.1111/sjoe.12309
• Languages: English
• ISSNs: 0347-0520

Abstract

Abstract: When a region successfully attracts a firm by offering subsidies, the firm often commits itself to performance targets in terms of employment. In this paper, we interpret these firm‐specific targets as a consequence of incomplete information. We analyze a model of two regions that compete for a firm, assuming that the firm's productivity is ex ante unknown. We show that performance targets often induce overemployment in high‐productivity firms, and that tax credits are often superior to lump‐sum payments. Moreover, when regions differ in wage rates, the low‐wage region wins the bid and has a higher surplus than under complete information. Finally, we show that, under incomplete information, bidding might not lead to efficient firm location.