The Role of Side Payments in the Formation of Asymmetric Alliances: Forging the US–Pakistan Alliance. (August 2019)

• Record Type: Journal Article
• Authors: Kabir, Muhammad
• Is Part Of: Journal of Asian security and international affairs. Volume 6:Number 2(2019:Aug.)
• Page Start: 162
• Page End: 188
• Publication Date: 2019-08
• Subjects: Alliance politics -- asymmetric alliances -- side payments -- South Asia -- the US–Pakistan relations; Security, International -- Asia -- Periodicals; National security -- Asia -- Periodicals; Asia -- Foreign relations -- Periodicals; Asia -- Politics and government -- Periodicals; 327.095
• DOI: 10.1177/2347797019842430
• Languages: English
• ISSNs: 2347-7970

Abstract

Abstract: The article builds on James Morrow's theoretical formulation on asymmetric alliances, which contends that alliances are formed as a result of a security–autonomy trade-off between great powers and minor powers. It expands Morrow's theory by showing that in the absence of a common threat or shared interests, the trade-off tends to leave a deficit in a weaker state's net benefits from the alliance. I argue that side payments fill in the deficit in gains for weaker states. The article highlights the importance of domestic political constraints in shaping leaders' alliance policies. I use the US–Pakistan alliance as a case study to probe the argument. The analysis presented here shows that the alliance, formed in 1954, was a result of a strategic trade-off between the United States and Pakistan. The case provides support to the argument that side payments played a crucial role in cementing the alliance.