Implicit bias, ideological bias, and epistemic risks in philosophy. (29th June 2018)

• Record Type: Journal Article
• Authors: Peters, Uwe
• Is Part Of: Mind & language. Volume 34:Number 3(2019:Jun.)
• Page Start: 393
• Page End: 419
• Publication Date: 2018-06-29
• Subjects: epistemic risks -- ideological bias -- implicit bias; Psycholinguistics -- Periodicals; Thought and thinking -- Periodicals; Language and languages -- Philosophy -- Periodicals; 153.42
• DOI: 10.1111/mila.12194
• Languages: English
• ISSNs: 0268-1064

Abstract

Abstract : It has been argued that implicit biases are operative in philosophy and lead to significant epistemic costs in the field. Philosophers working on this issue have focused mainly on implicit gender and race biases. They have overlooked ideological bias, which targets political orientations. Psychologists have found ideological bias in their field and have argued that it has negative epistemic effects on scientific research. I relate this debate to the field of philosophy and argue that if, as some studies suggest, the same bias also exists in philosophy then it will lead to hitherto unrecognised epistemic hazards in the field. Furthermore, the bias is epistemically different from the more familiar biases in respects that are important for epistemology, ethics, and metaphilosophy.