Individual mobility promotes punishment in evolutionary public goods games. Issue 1 (December 2017)

• Record Type: Journal Article
• Authors: Cong, Rui; Zhao, Qianchuan; Li, Kun; Wang, Long
• Is Part Of: Scientific reports. Volume 7:Issue 1(2017)
• Page Start: 1
• Page End: 9
• Publication Date: 2017-12
• Subjects: Natural history -- Research -- Periodicals; Biology -- Research -- Periodicals; Physical sciences -- Research -- Periodicals; Earth sciences -- Research -- Periodicals; Environmental sciences -- Research -- Periodicals; 502.85
• DOI: 10.1038/s41598-017-12823-4
• Languages: English
• ISSNs: 2045-2322

Abstract

Abstract In explaining the pressing issue in biology and social sciences how cooperation emerges in a population of self-interested individuals, researchers recently pay intensive attentions to the role altruistic punishment plays. However, as higher-order cooperators, survival of punishers is puzzling due to their extra cost in regulating norm violators. Previous works have highlighted the importance of individual mobility in promoting cooperation. Yet its effect on punishers remains to be explored. In this work we incorporate this feature into modeling the behavior of punishers, who are endowed with a choice between leaving current place or staying and punishing defectors. Results indicate that optimal mobility level of punishers is closely related to the cost of punishing. For considerably large cost, there exists medium tendency of migration which favors the survival of punishers. This holds for both the direct competition between punishers and defectors and the case where cooperators are involved, and can also be observed when various types of punishers with different mobility tendencies fight against defectors simultaneously. For cheap punishment, mobility does not provide with punishers more advantage even when they are initially rare. We hope our work provide more insight into understanding the role individual mobility plays in promoting public cooperation.