The Fairness of Solidarity Bills under the Solidarity Value of Nowak and Radzik. (23rd April 2015)

• Record Type: Journal Article
• Authors: Diffo Lambo, Lawrence; Wambo, Pierre
• Other Names: Briec Walter Academic Editor.
• Is Part Of: Game theory. Volume 2015(2015)
• Publication Date: 2015-04-23
• Subjects: Game theory -- Periodicals; Game theory; Periodicals; 519.3
• DOI: 10.1155/2015/450208
• Languages: English
• ISSNs: 2314-6559

Abstract

Abstract : The solidarity value is a variant of the well-known Shapley value in which some sense of solidarity between the players is implemented allowing the disabled to receive help from the fortunate ones. We investigate on how fairly solidarity expenses are shared. We discuss the unwanted side effect of someone paying undue solidarity contributions as far as reversing his condition from a privileged to a needy person. A deeper case study is conducted for two classes of TU games that we obtain by modeling two real world business contexts. Here, we trace all player to player transfers of funds that arise when solidarity actions are processed, and we answer the question of who settles the solidarity bills. Also, we obtain the threshold position of a player below which he gets solidarity help, but above which he instead pays out donation.