Nash Equilibria in Large Games. (18th March 2014)

• Record Type: Journal Article
• Authors: Glycopantis, Dionysius
• Other Names: Briec Walter Academic Editor.
• Is Part Of: Game theory. Volume 2014(2014)
• Publication Date: 2014-03-18
• Subjects: Game theory -- Periodicals; Game theory; Periodicals; 519.3
• DOI: 10.1155/2014/617596
• Languages: English
• ISSNs: 2314-6559

Abstract

Abstract : This paper adds to the discussion, in a general setting, that given a Nash-Schmeidler (nonanonymous) game it is not always possible to define a Mas-Colell (anonymous) game. In the two games, the players have different strategic behaviours and the formulations of the two problems are different. Also, we offer a novel explanation for the lack of a Nash equilibrium in an infinite game. We consider this game as the limit of a sequence of approximate, finite games for which an equilibrium exists. However, the limiting pure strategy function is not measurable.