Politically connected boards, value or cost: evidence from a natural experiment in China. (22nd April 2016)

• Record Type: Journal Article
• Authors: Han, Jianlei; Zhang, Guangli
• Editors: Smith, Tom
• Is Part Of: Accounting and finance. Volume 58:Number 1(2018)
• Page Start: 149
• Page End: 169
• Publication Date: 2016-04-22
• Subjects: Political Connection -- Outside Director -- Regulatory Change -- Resignations; Accounting -- Periodicals; Finance -- Periodicals; 657.05
• DOI: 10.1111/acfi.12215
• Languages: English
• ISSNs: 0810-5391

Abstract

Abstract: This study investigates the net effect of a politically connected board for a firm. Using a natural experiment in China – a regulatory change to forbid bureaucrats from sitting on the board of public firms – we address the causality of the net effect of a politically connected board by testing the market reaction of the shares of firm targeted by the regulatory change to the policy announcement. The stocks of firms with politically connected directors who are targeted by the regulatory change show on average a significantly positive abnormal return, which suggests that the agency cost effect of a politically connected director dominates the value effect. The result is robust to various model settings and to a matched sample using the propensity score methodology. Additionally, the announcement effect of the resignation of a politically connected director is significantly positive, and significantly higher than that of a non‐connected director. Overall, our results suggest that the agency cost effect of a politically connected director dominates the value effect.