A Paradox Involving Representational States and Activities. (14th February 2019)

• Record Type: Journal Article
• Authors: Myers, Blake
• Is Part Of: Thought. Volume 8:Number 2(2019:Jun.)
• Page Start: 96
• Page End: 100
• Publication Date: 2019-02-14
• Subjects: paradox -- logic -- truth -- contradiction -- representation; Philosophy -- Periodicals; Logic -- Periodicals; Knowledge, Theory of -- Periodicals; 105
• DOI: 10.1002/tht3.409
• Languages: English
• ISSNs: 2161-2234

Abstract

Abstract : In this paper, I present a novel paradox that pertains to a variety of representational states and activities. I begin by proving that there are certain contingently true propositions that no one can occurrently believe. Then, I use this to develop a further proof by which I derive a contradiction, thus giving us the paradox. Next, I differentiate the paradox from the Liar Paradox, and I show how a common response to the different variations of the Liar Paradox fails to avoid the type of paradox provided in this paper. Finally, I demonstrate how the general ideas behind the paradox regarding occurrent belief can be extended to a wide range of other representational states and activities.