Can We Comply with the Ideal of Value-Freedom? A Reply to Miller's Critique of the Ideal of Value-Freedom in Science. Issue 1 (2nd January 2019)

• Record Type: Journal Article
• Authors: Djørup, Stine; Kappel, Klemens; Halsson, Bjørn Gunnar
• Is Part Of: Ethics, policy & environment. Volume 22:Issue 1(2019)
• Page Start: 90
• Page End: 99
• Publication Date: 2019-01-02
• Subjects: Environmental ethics -- Periodicals; Environmental policy -- Periodicals; 179.1
• DOI: 10.1080/21550085.2019.1581414
• Languages: English
• ISSNs: 2155-0085

Abstract

ABSTRACT: The purpose of this paper is to discuss Miller's recent claim that 1) the ideal of value-freedom is implausible because evidence from experimental psychology reveals how scientific reasoning is value-laden and biased, and 2) that the ideal of value-freedom requires the exercise of complex conceptual distinctions that scientists cannot make. According to Miller, the ideal of value-freedom, therefore, violates the principle that ought implies can. The paper replies 1) that experimental psychology may show that science is value-laden in some sense, yet this does not imply that the ideal of value-freedom should be rejected as unachievable. This is because scientists can reduce the influence from non-epistemic values, inter alia, by employing debiasing techniques and other scientific procedures. The paper also replies that 2) the ideal of value-freedom in science does not violate the principle that ought implies can because scientists do not seem to need a philosophical vocabulary in order to make the relevant distinctions between different epistemic attitudes.