Permissible Epistemic Trade-Offs. Issue 2 (3rd April 2019)

• Record Type: Journal Article
• Authors: Singer, Daniel J.
• Is Part Of: Australasian journal of philosophy. Volume 97:Issue 2(2019)
• Page Start: 281
• Page End: 293
• Publication Date: 2019-04-03
• Subjects: epistemic consequentialism -- trade-off objections -- epistemology -- normativity; Philosophy -- Periodicals; Psychology -- Periodicals; 105
• DOI: 10.1080/00048402.2018.1465987
• Languages: English
• ISSNs: 0004-8402

Abstract

ABSTRACT: Recent rejections of epistemic consequentialism, like those from Firth, Jenkins, Berker, and Greaves, have argued that consequentialism is committed to objectionable trade-offs and suggest that consequentialism's propensity for trade-offs hints at a larger problem. Here I argue that sanctioning trade-offs isn't a fault of a theory of epistemic normativity, because there are permissible epistemic trade-offs. I give examples of permissible epistemic trade-offs in pedagogy, in changes of worldview, and in indirect epistemic decisions. I also show that views that sanction trade-offs have an easier time than their rivals in explaining both why we ought to be open-minded and how arguments with suppositions get their argumentative force. These considerations don't eliminate the consequentialist's burden to respond to the objectionable cases, but they do undermine the idea that no correct theory of epistemic normativity properly sanctions trade-offs.