Budget Allocation in a Competitive Communication Spectrum Economy. (4th March 2009)

• Record Type: Journal Article
• Authors: Lin, Ming-Hua; Tsai, Jung-Fa; Ye, Yinyu
• Other Names: Han Zhu Academic Editor.
• Is Part Of: EURASIP journal on advances in signal processing. Volume 2009(2009)
• Publication Date: 2009-03-04
• Subjects: Signal processing -- Periodicals; Traitement du signal; Signal processing; Periodicals; 621.3822
• DOI: 10.1155/2009/963717
• Languages: English
• ISSNs: 1687-6172

Abstract

Abstract : This study discusses how to adjust "monetary budget" to meet each user's physical power demand, or balance all individual utilities in a competitive "spectrum market" of a communication system. In the market, multiple users share a common frequency or tone band and each of them uses the budget to purchase its own transmit power spectra (taking others as given) in maximizing its Shannon utility or pay-off function that includes the effect of interferences. A market equilibrium is a budget allocation, price spectrum, and tone power distribution that independently and simultaneously maximizes each user's utility. The equilibrium conditions of the market are formulated and analyzed, and the existence of an equilibrium is proved. Computational results and comparisons between the competitive equilibrium and Nash equilibrium solutions are also presented, which show that the competitive market equilibrium solution often provides more efficient power distribution.