Embracing the Meta-Copernican Turn: Non-decomposition and Mechanistic Explanations. Issue 2 (3rd April 2018)

• Record Type: Journal Article
• Authors: Meyer, Russell
• Is Part Of: Australasian philosophical review. Volume 2:Issue 2(2018)
• Page Start: 214
• Page End: 218
• Publication Date: 2018-04-03
• Subjects: decomposition -- embodied cognition -- interventionism -- reductionism -- mechanistic explanation; Philosophy -- Periodicals; 101
• DOI: 10.1080/24740500.2018.1552100
• Languages: English
• ISSNs: 2474-0500

Abstract

Abstract: In line with proponents of 4E cognition, Gallagher [2019 ] is concerned that many cognitive phenomena are not amenable to decomposition strategies since their very nature is to be constituted extensively. By contrast the received view on causal explanation—the mechanistic account [Craver2007 ]—emphasises the necessity for decomposition in explaining natural phenomena and insists on a sharp distinction between causal versus constitutive relations. I propose that removing the requirement that constitutive relations cannot also be causes helps to ease this tension between explanation and Gallagher's non-decompositional stance, per Leuridan [2012 ]. Further, I draw on Froese et al.'s [2013] minimal model of social cognition to argue that constitutive relations can and do act as causal difference-makers in the Woodwardian sense [Woodward2003 ].