Phenomenology and Cognitive Neuroscience: Can a Process Ontology Help Resolve the Impasse?. Issue 2 (3rd April 2018)

• Record Type: Journal Article
• Authors: Pain, Ross
• Is Part Of: Australasian philosophical review. Volume 2:Issue 2(2018)
• Page Start: 204
• Page End: 208
• Publication Date: 2018-04-03
• Subjects: cognitive neuroscience -- embodied cognition -- phenomenology -- process ontology; Philosophy -- Periodicals; 101
• DOI: 10.1080/24740500.2018.1552098
• Languages: English
• ISSNs: 2474-0500

Abstract

Abstract: Shaun Gallagher [2019 ] argues for a 'non-classical' conception of nature, which includes subjects as irreducible constituents. As such, first-person phenomenology can be naturalised and at the same time resist reduction to the third-person. In the first part of this paper, I raise three concerns for the claim that nature is irreducibly subject-involving. In the second part of the paper, I suggest that embracing a process ontology could help strengthen Gallagher's proposal.