Theory, Practice, and Non-reductive (Meta)Science. Issue 2 (3rd April 2018)

• Record Type: Journal Article
• Authors: Sanches de Oliveira, Guilherme
• Is Part Of: Australasian philosophical review. Volume 2:Issue 2(2018)
• Page Start: 199
• Page End: 203
• Publication Date: 2018-04-03
• Subjects: embodiment -- life-world -- philosophy of science -- pragmatism -- skillful coping -- theory; Philosophy -- Periodicals; 101
• DOI: 10.1080/24740500.2018.1552097
• Languages: English
• ISSNs: 2474-0500

Abstract

Abstract: Are the theoretical frameworks of phenomenology and of science compatible? And, if so, what would a reconciliation entail for science as it is practiced ? Gallagher [2019 ] poses these two questions, answering the first in the affirmative and leaving the second unaddressed. I argue that treating the two as separate questions presupposes an inadequate distinction between theory and practice that Gallagher's non-reductive framework motivates rejecting. Recognizing the intertwining of theory and practice allows us to answer Gallagher's two questions about phenomenology and science all at once, but it also motivates a less conciliatory conclusion than the one he offers.