Bayesian game theorists and non-Bayesian players. Issue 6 (2nd November 2018)

• Record Type: Journal Article
• Authors: Lecouteux, Guilhem
• Is Part Of: European journal of the history of economic thought. Volume 25:Issue 6(2018)
• Page Start: 1420
• Page End: 1454
• Publication Date: 2018-11-02
• Subjects: Bayesianism -- common belief in rationality -- epistemic game theory -- interactive epistemology -- prior beliefs; B21 -- C72 -- D81; Economic history -- Periodicals; 330.94
• DOI: 10.1080/09672567.2018.1523207
• Languages: English
• ISSNs: 0967-2567

Abstract

Abstract: Bayesian game theorists claim to represent players as Bayes rational agents, maximising their expected utility given their beliefs about the choices of other players. I argue that this narrative is inconsistent with the formal structure of Bayesian game theory. This is because (i) the assumption of common belief in rationality is equivalent to equilibrium play, as in classical game theory, and (ii) the players' prior beliefs are a mere mathematical artefact and not actual beliefs held by the players. Bayesian game theory is thus a Bayesian representation of the choice of players who are committed to play equilibrium strategy profiles.