Hume on Belief and Vindicatory Explanations. (25th April 2019)

• Record Type: Journal Article
• Authors: Smith, Benedict
• Is Part Of: Philosophy. Volume 94:Number 2(2019)
• Page Start: 313
• Page End: 337
• Publication Date: 2019-04-25
• Subjects: Philosophy -- Periodicals; 100
• DOI: 10.1017/S0031819119000111
• Languages: English
• ISSNs: 0031-8191

Abstract

Abstract: Hume's account of belief is understood to be inspired by allegedly incompatible motivations, one descriptive and expressing Hume's naturalism, the other normative and expressing Hume's epistemological aims. This understanding assumes a particular way in which these elements are distinct: an assumption that I dispute. I suggest that the explanatory-naturalistic aspects of Hume's account of belief are not incompatible with the normative-epistemological aspects. Rather, at least for some central cases of belief formation that Hume discusses at length, S's coming to believe that p can be explained in a way that vindicates S's belief that p .