When Are Monetary Policy Preferences Egocentric? Evidence from American Surveys and an Experiment. Issue 1 (6th July 2015)

• Record Type: Journal Article
• Authors: Bearce, David H.; Tuxhorn, Kim‐Lee
• Is Part Of: American journal of political science. Volume 61:Issue 1(2017)
• Page Start: 178
• Page End: 193
• Publication Date: 2015-07-06
• Subjects: Political science -- Periodicals; Electronic journals; Computer network resources; 320.05
• DOI: 10.1111/ajps.12203
• Languages: English
• ISSNs: 0092-5853

Abstract

Abstract : This article enters the international/comparative political economy debate about whether individual‐level macroeconomic policy preferences are egocentric and, if so, on what basis (factors, sectors, or firms). It argues that contextual information may function as a precondition for the emergence of egocentric preferences. With a focus on the trade‐off between using monetary policy for a domestic or an international goal, it presents evidence from three original American surveys using informative vignettes to show how monetary policy preferences exhibit firm‐based egocentric variation: Individuals whose employer does most of its business in overseas markets have a lesser preference for domestic monetary autonomy. It also presents evidence from a survey experiment to show how the strength of this egocentric relationship depends on the informative power of the vignette: A more contextually informative vignette produces a stronger relationship between overseas business activity and a preference against domestic monetary autonomy.