The modeling of coalition for environmental protection within co-utility framework. (2nd December 2017)

• Record Type: Journal Article
• Authors: Osmani, Dritan
• Is Part Of: Optimization. Volume 66:Number 12(2017)
• Page Start: 2193
• Page End: 2209
• Publication Date: 2017-12-02
• Subjects: Coalition formation -- co-utility -- game theory -- farsighted stability -- myopic stability -- integrated assessment modelling; Mathematical optimization -- Periodicals; 519.7
• DOI: 10.1080/02331934.2017.1362403
• Languages: English
• ISSNs: 0233-1934

Abstract

Abstract: The game theoretic modelling of coalition for environmental protection within the framework of a new concept of co-utility is discussed. The co-utility concept contains mainly two elements. Firstly, agents can increase their payoffs by collaborating with each-other. Secondly, the outcome of collaboration is robust towards internal and external disturbances. The advantages of using of co-utility are two-fold. Primarily, the co-utility concept is broad and can serve as an umbrella concept in all applications where agents have a space for simultaneous improvement of payoffs. Secondly the co-utility concept can be associated with different stability concept such as myopic or farsighted stability. The myopic and farsighted co-utile sets are defined and their element-co-utile outcomes are found.