Secured flooding time synchronization protocol with moderator. (30th July 2013)

• Record Type: Journal Article
• Authors: Huang, Ding‐Jie; Teng, Wei‐Chung; Yang, Kai‐Ting
• Other Names: Chen Hsiao‐Hwa guestEditor.; Deng Der‐Jiunn guestEditor.; Cheng Rung‐Shiang guestEditor.; Chilamkurti Naveen guestEditor.; Yu Qiyue guestEditor.
• Is Part Of: International journal of communication systems. Volume 26:Number 9(2013:Sep.)
• Page Start: 1092
• Page End: 1115
• Publication Date: 2013-07-30
• Subjects: FTSP -- clock skew -- WSN -- traitor attack -- replication attack; Telecommunication systems -- Periodicals; 621.382
• DOI: 10.1002/dac.2614
• Languages: English
• ISSNs: 1074-5351

Abstract

SUMMARY: This work aims to address the security vulnerability of the Flooding Time Synchronization Protocol (FTSP), which is currently one of the most popular approaches for time synchronization in wireless sensor networks. FTSP has advanced features, such as implicitly dynamic topology and high time accuracy, but still has unresolved security issues. In order to defend against attacks from malicious nodes, we propose several technologies to reinforce the structure of FTSP. First, a reference node selecting mechanism is proposed to reduce the effect of multiple reference nodes, and four filters are proposed to defend against seqNum attack, global time attack and node replication attack. Experiment results show that the proposed sequence number blacklist filter and the global time blacklist filter are effective in defending against the aforementioned attacks. Second, a new root selection mechanism is proposed to secure the process of updating the root node. Combining the root selection mechanism with the global time black list filter, the proposed mechanisms successfully defend against traitor attacks on FTSP in our experiment. Copyright © 2013 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd. Abstract : This work aims to address the security vulnerability of flooding time synchronization protocol, which is currently one of the most popular approaches for time synchronization in wireless sensor networks. To defend against attacks from malicious nodes, we propose several technologies to reinforce the structure of flooding time synchronization protocol. The experiment results show that the proposed technologies can successfully defend against seqNum attacks, global time attacks, node replication attacks, and traitor attacks.