Linking anticorruption threats, performance pay, administrative outputs, and policy outcomes in China. (6th December 2018)

• Record Type: Journal Article
• Authors: Liang, Jiaqi; Langbein, Laura
• Other Names: Steen Trui guestEditor.; Schott Carina guestEditor.; van Kleef Daphne guestEditor.
• Is Part Of: Public administration. Volume 97:Number 1(2019)
• Page Start: 177
• Page End: 194
• Publication Date: 2018-12-06
• Subjects: Public administration -- Periodicals; Civil service -- Periodicals; 350
• DOI: 10.1111/padm.12562
• Languages: English
• ISSNs: 0033-3298

Abstract

Abstract : Little is known about the effects of two prominent public sector reforms—anticorruption efforts and high‐powered incentive systems—on the accomplishment of policy goals in the absence of the rule of law and in the presence of an extrinsic incentive to take advantage of corruption to achieve performance targets. This study explores how performance rewards and anticorruption efforts jointly affect administrative outputs and policy outcomes. We examine China's air pollution control policy with province‐level panel data. The analysis shows that performance rewards prompt administrative outputs that are linked to the incentive structure. Anticorruption activities have small significant, positive effects on those outputs only prior to the inception of high‐powered rewards, but have no significant effect on policy outcomes, regardless of the measure. The introduction of performance incentives contributes to the achievement of policy outcomes only when their measurement is subject to government manipulation.