Agency and observation in knowledge of one's own thinking. (11th July 2018)

• Record Type: Journal Article
• Authors: Doyle, Casey
• Is Part Of: European journal of philosophy. Volume 27:Number 1(2019)
• Page Start: 148
• Page End: 161
• Publication Date: 2018-07-11
• Subjects: Philosophy -- Periodicals; Philosophy, European -- Periodicals; Philosophy, Modern -- 20th century -- Periodicals; 190
• DOI: 10.1111/ejop.12378
• Languages: English
• ISSNs: 0966-8373

Abstract

Abstract: This essay addresses the question how we know our conscious thinking. Conscious thinking typically takes the form of a series of discrete episodes that constitute a complex cognitive activity. We must distinguish the discrete episodes of thinking in which a particular content is represented in phenomenal consciousness and is present "before the mind's eye" from the extended activities of which these episodes form a part. The extended activities are themselves contentful and we have first‐person access to them. But because their content is not represented in phenomenal consciousness, this access cannot be broadly observational. Instead, I argue, it is agential. Furthermore, that extended activities are intentional explains the possibility of a nonobservational form of introspective access to the discrete episodes in consciousness.