Legislator Dissent as a Valence Signal. Issue 1 (24th June 2016)

• Record Type: Journal Article
• Authors: Campbell, Rosie; Cowley, Philip; Vivyan, Nick; Wagner, Markus
• Is Part Of: British journal of political science. Volume 49:Issue 1(2019)
• Page Start: 105
• Page End: 128
• Publication Date: 2016-06-24
• Subjects: Political science -- Periodicals; 320.05
• DOI: 10.1017/S0007123416000223
• Languages: English
• ISSNs: 0007-1234

Abstract

Abstract : Existing research suggests that voters tend to respond positively to legislator independence due to two types of mechanism. First, dissent has an indirect effect, increasing a legislator's media coverage and personal recognition among constituents ( profile effects ). Secondly, constituents react positively to dissent when this signals that the legislator has matching political or representational preferences ( conditional evaluation ). This article presents a third effect: dissent acts as a valence signal of integrity and trustworthiness. Consistent with the valence signalling mechanism, it uses new observational and experimental evidence to show that British voters have a strong and largely unconditional preference for legislators who dissent. The findings pose a dilemma for political systems that rely on strong and cohesive parties.