THE INSTABILITY OF JOHN RAWLS'S "STABILITY FOR THE RIGHT REASONS". (22nd May 2017)
- Record Type:
- Journal Article
- Title:
- THE INSTABILITY OF JOHN RAWLS'S "STABILITY FOR THE RIGHT REASONS". (22nd May 2017)
- Main Title:
- THE INSTABILITY OF JOHN RAWLS'S "STABILITY FOR THE RIGHT REASONS"
- Authors:
- Chung, Hun
- Abstract:
- ABSTRACT: John Rawls's most mature notion of political order is "stability for the right reasons." Stability for the right reasons is the kind of political order that Rawls hoped a well-ordered society could ideally achieve. In this paper, I demonstrate through the tools of modern game theory, the instability of "stability for the right reasons." Specifically, I will show that a well-ordered society can completely destabilize by the introduction of an arbitrarily small number of non-compliers whenever individuals fail to achieve full common knowledge ever so slightly.
- Is Part Of:
- Episteme. Volume 16:Number 1(2019)
- Journal:
- Episteme
- Issue:
- Volume 16:Number 1(2019)
- Issue Display:
- Volume 16, Issue 1 (2019)
- Year:
- 2019
- Volume:
- 16
- Issue:
- 1
- Issue Sort Value:
- 2019-0016-0001-0000
- Page Start:
- 1
- Page End:
- 17
- Publication Date:
- 2017-05-22
- Subjects:
- Social epistemology -- Periodicals
121 - Journal URLs:
- http://muse.jhu.edu/journals/episteme/ ↗
- DOI:
- 10.1017/epi.2017.14 ↗
- Languages:
- English
- ISSNs:
- 1742-3600
- Deposit Type:
- Legaldeposit
- View Content:
- Available online (eLD content is only available in our Reading Rooms) ↗
- Physical Locations:
- British Library HMNTS - ELD Digital Store
- Ingest File:
- 9599.xml