Conventionalism defended: a reply to Moore. Issue 1 (2nd January 2019)

• Record Type: Journal Article
• Authors: Morgan, William
• Is Part Of: Journal of the philosophy of sport. Volume 46:Issue 1(2019)
• Page Start: 98
• Page End: 107
• Publication Date: 2019-01-02
• Subjects: Broad internalism -- conventions -- moral principles -- practical rationality -- normative conflicts; Sports -- Philosophy -- Periodicals; 796.01
• DOI: 10.1080/00948705.2019.1571924
• Languages: English
• ISSNs: 0094-8705

Abstract

ABSTRACT: In a recent article in this Journal, Eric Moore criticized an earlier essay of mine published in this same Journal on two fronts. On the first, he criticized my criticisms of broad internalism for relying on abstract moral principles too far removed from the practice of sport to adjudicate normative conflicts in which disputants cannot agree on what is the purpose of sport. On the second front, he criticized my reliance on what he called Rorty's "controversial" views of truth and rationality to back up my criticisms of broad internalism. I find both criticisms forceful but not persuasive. In my reply, therefore, I defend both use of Rorty's and other similar historicist takes on rational justification and my criticisms of broad internalism principles-based approach to normative inquiry in sport.