A new puzzle about belief and credence. Issue 2 (17th February 2019)

• Record Type: Journal Article
• Authors: Moon, Andrew
• Is Part Of: Canadian journal of philosophy. Volume 49:Issue 2(2019)
• Page Start: 272
• Page End: 291
• Publication Date: 2019-02-17
• Subjects: Credal expressivism -- belief -- credence -- confidence -- epistemic modals; Philosophy -- Periodicals; 105
• DOI: 10.1080/00455091.2018.1503028
• Languages: English
• ISSNs: 0045-5091

Abstract

ABSTRACT: I present a puzzle about belief and credence, which takes the form of three independently supported views that are mutually inconsistent. The first is the view that S has a modal belief that p (e.g., S believes that probably- p ) if and only if S has a corresponding credence that p . The second is the view that S believes that p only if S has some credence that p . The third is the view that, possibly, S believes that p without a modal belief that p . [Word Count: 85]