Satisfactory content delivery scheme for QoS provisioning in delay tolerant networks. (8th November 2018)
- Record Type:
- Journal Article
- Title:
- Satisfactory content delivery scheme for QoS provisioning in delay tolerant networks. (8th November 2018)
- Main Title:
- Satisfactory content delivery scheme for QoS provisioning in delay tolerant networks
- Authors:
- Ezzahidi, Sidi Ahmed
Sabir, Essaid
Ghogho, Mounir - Abstract:
- Summary: We deal in this article with the content forwarding problem in delay tolerant networks (DTNs). We first formulate the content delivery interaction as a noncooperative satisfaction game. On one hand, the source node seeks to ensure a delivery probability above some given threshold. On the other hand, the relay nodes seek to maximize their own payoffs. The source node offers a reward (virtual coins) to the relay, which caches and forwards the file to the final destination. Each relay has to solve the dilemma of accepting/rejecting to cache the source's file. Cooperation incurs energy cost due to caching, carrying, and forwarding the source's file. Yet when a relay accepts to cooperate, it may receive some reward if it succeeds to be the first relay to forward the content to the destination. Otherwise, the relay may receive some penalty in the form of a constant regret; the latter parameter is introduced to make incentive for cooperation. Next, we introduce the concept of satisfaction equilibrium (SE) as a solution concept to the induced game. Now, the source node is solely interested in reaching a file delivery probability greater than some given threshold, while the relays behave rationally to maximize their respective payoffs. Full characterizations of the SEs for both pure and mixed strategies are derived. Furthermore, we propose two learning algorithms allowing the players (source/relays) to reach the SE strategies. Finally, extensive numerical investigations andSummary: We deal in this article with the content forwarding problem in delay tolerant networks (DTNs). We first formulate the content delivery interaction as a noncooperative satisfaction game. On one hand, the source node seeks to ensure a delivery probability above some given threshold. On the other hand, the relay nodes seek to maximize their own payoffs. The source node offers a reward (virtual coins) to the relay, which caches and forwards the file to the final destination. Each relay has to solve the dilemma of accepting/rejecting to cache the source's file. Cooperation incurs energy cost due to caching, carrying, and forwarding the source's file. Yet when a relay accepts to cooperate, it may receive some reward if it succeeds to be the first relay to forward the content to the destination. Otherwise, the relay may receive some penalty in the form of a constant regret; the latter parameter is introduced to make incentive for cooperation. Next, we introduce the concept of satisfaction equilibrium (SE) as a solution concept to the induced game. Now, the source node is solely interested in reaching a file delivery probability greater than some given threshold, while the relays behave rationally to maximize their respective payoffs. Full characterizations of the SEs for both pure and mixed strategies are derived. Furthermore, we propose two learning algorithms allowing the players (source/relays) to reach the SE strategies. Finally, extensive numerical investigations and some learning simulations are carried out to illustrate the behavior of the interacting nodes and to give some insightful thoughts on how to fine‐tune the network setting. Abstract : This paper introduce QoS for delay tolerant network (DTN) environments. Here, we consider the long‐term delivery probability as a metric to measure QoS. A source node seeks to reach a target delivery probability. Then, it incentives the relay nodes in order to participate in forwarding the content file to the final destination. The relay nodes decide strategically to participate or not to participate in the caching game. … (more)
- Is Part Of:
- International journal of communication systems. Volume 32:Number 2(2019)
- Journal:
- International journal of communication systems
- Issue:
- Volume 32:Number 2(2019)
- Issue Display:
- Volume 32, Issue 2 (2019)
- Year:
- 2019
- Volume:
- 32
- Issue:
- 2
- Issue Sort Value:
- 2019-0032-0002-0000
- Page Start:
- n/a
- Page End:
- n/a
- Publication Date:
- 2018-11-08
- Subjects:
- content caching -- delay tolerant network -- distributed learning -- energy efficiency -- reward‐penalty incentive mechanism -- satisfaction equilibrium
Telecommunication systems -- Periodicals
621.382 - Journal URLs:
- http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/ ↗
- DOI:
- 10.1002/dac.3844 ↗
- Languages:
- English
- ISSNs:
- 1074-5351
- Deposit Type:
- Legaldeposit
- View Content:
- Available online (eLD content is only available in our Reading Rooms) ↗
- Physical Locations:
- British Library DSC - 4542.172515
British Library DSC - BLDSS-3PM
British Library STI - ELD Digital store - Ingest File:
- 9289.xml