Justice in circumstances of transition: comments on Colleen Murphy's theory of transitional justice as justice of a special type. Issue 2 (4th May 2018)

• Record Type: Journal Article
• Authors: Hull, George
• Is Part Of: Journal of global ethics. Volume 14:Issue 2(2018)
• Page Start: 147
• Page End: 158
• Publication Date: 2018-05-04
• Subjects: Transitional justice -- corrective justice -- retributive justice -- restorative justice -- distributive justice; International relations -- Moral and ethical aspects -- Periodicals; Social ethics -- Periodicals; 170
• DOI: 10.1080/17449626.2018.1506998
• Languages: English
• ISSNs: 1744-9626

Abstract

ABSTRACT: Colleen Murphy has argued that in circumstances of societal transition only one special type of justice is applicable: 'transitional justice', a type of justice not reducible to any other type or types (such as retributive, distributive, restorative or corrective justice). I take issue with Murphy's conclusion, showing that retributive, distributive and corrective justice all feature as isolable component parts in her own positive account of transitional justice. I also argue that restorative justice is applicable and important in transitional societies when the state itself has perpetrated serious wrongs. Murphy claims that each distinct type of justice is a response to a unique 'basic problem of justice', triggered by a background set of 'circumstances'. However, I argue that identifying such a basic problem neither necessarily means the circumstances in question call for a unique type of justice, nor is sufficient to determine which type of justice is most salient in the circumstances. What is more, I show that Murphy applies her own methodology inconsistently in her treatment of transitional societies and stable democracies. I argue that what Murphy calls 'transitional justice' is composed of familiar types of justice as well as other moral values, but also regrettable – though often unavoidable – injustice.