Conditional Factors of Political Budget Cycles: Economic Development, Media Pressure, and Political Fragmentation. Issue 4 (2nd October 2018)

• Record Type: Journal Article
• Authors: Cuadrado-Ballesteros, Beatriz; García-Sánchez, Isabel-María
• Is Part Of: Public performance & management review. Volume 41:Issue 4(2018)
• Page Start: 835
• Page End: 858
• Publication Date: 2018-10-02
• Subjects: political behavior -- political budget cycles -- public budgeting -- public finance -- voting; Civil service -- Labor productivity -- Periodicals; Civil service -- Labor productivity -- United States -- Periodicals; Government productivity -- Periodicals; Government productivity -- United States -- Periodicals; Public administration -- Periodicals; Public administration -- United States -- Periodicals; Civil service -- Labor productivity; Government productivity; Public administration; United States; Periodicals; 351.05
• DOI: 10.1080/15309576.2018.1465829
• Languages: English
• ISSNs: 1530-9576

Abstract

Abstract: This study clarifies the heterogeneity of results in the political budget cycle (PBC) literature by asking which factors are more likely to produce these cycles. Our findings for a sample of 145 Spanish local governments over the period 2005–2013 suggest that governments tend to behave opportunistically when media pressure is low and political fragmentation is high, but they behave ideologically when media pressure and political concentration increase. Economic development also partially explains the differences among partisan PBCs, although we find opportunistic PBCs in both less and more developed municipalities. These findings support Frey and Schneider's conclusion of no simultaneity of opportunistic and partisan PBCs.