LAW ENFORCEMENT AND WRONGFUL ARRESTS WITH ENDOGENOUSLY (IN)COMPETENT OFFICERS. (4th December 2017)

• Record Type: Journal Article
• Authors: Mishra, Ajit; Samuel, Andrew
• Is Part Of: Economic inquiry. Volume 56:Number 2(2018)
• Page Start: 1417
• Page End: 1436
• Publication Date: 2017-12-04
• Subjects: Economics -- Periodicals; 330.05
• DOI: 10.1111/ecin.12534
• Languages: English
• ISSNs: 0095-2583

Abstract

Abstract : Economic intuition suggests that enforcement errors incentivize crimes, therefore officers must be penalized for committing such errors. Legal scholars argue that if penalties for errors are severe, officers may become timid while policing (thereby encouraging crime). We evaluate these arguments in a model where officers invest in competence. Competence increases the officer's ability to identify criminals. Low sanctions for errors encourages bold policing by officers but may still raise the equilibrium level of crime because it also discourages investments in competence. Granting immunity to only competent officers ("qualified immunity") reduces both errors and crimes when competence is observable. ( JEL K4, K42, L5)