A Deliberative Approach to Causation. (3rd September 2017)

• Record Type: Journal Article
• Authors: Fernandes, Alison Sutton
• Is Part Of: Philosophy and phenomenological research. Volume 95:Number 3(2017)
• Page Start: 686
• Page End: 708
• Publication Date: 2017-09-03
• Subjects: Philosophy -- Periodicals; Phenomenology -- Periodicals; 100
• DOI: 10.1111/phpr.12443
• Languages: English
• ISSNs: 0031-8205

Abstract

Abstract : Fundamental physics makes no clear use of causal notions; it uses laws that operate in relevant respects in both temporal directions and that relate whole systems across times. But by relating causation to evidence, we can explain how causation fits in to a physical picture of the world and explain its temporal asymmetry. This paper takes up a deliberative approach to causation, according to which causal relations correspond to the evidential relations we need when we decide on one thing in order to achieve another. Tamsin's taking her umbrella is a cause of her staying dry, for example, if and only if her deciding to take her umbrella for the sake of staying dry is adequate grounds for believing she'll stay dry. This correspondence explains why causation matters: knowledge of causal structure helps us make decisions that are evidence of outcomes we seek. The account also explains why we can control the future and not the past, and why causes come before their effects. When agents properly deliberate, their decisions can never count as evidence for any outcomes they may seek in the past. From this it follows that causal relations don't run backwards. This deliberative asymmetry is itself traced back to asymmetries of evidence and entropy, providing a new way of deriving causal asymmetry from temporally symmetric laws.