Selection by committee: Anonymity and gratitude. Issue 4 (December 2018)

• Record Type: Journal Article
• Authors: Balletta, Luigi; Modica, Salvatore
• Is Part Of: Research in economics. Volume 72:Issue 4(2018)
• Page Start: 511
• Page End: 517
• Publication Date: 2018-12
• Subjects: Candidate selection -- Expert appointment -- Gratitude and reciprocity; C72 -- D02 -- M51; Economics -- Periodicals; Économie politique -- Périodiques; 330.05
• DOI: 10.1016/j.rie.2018.10.001
• Languages: English
• ISSNs: 1090-9443

Abstract

Abstract: What kind of candidate is selected into a job when the principal has to appoint a committee to measure the candidates' ability and select a winner? We find that if the committee takes into account the candidate's gratitude towards them, a candidate with less than first best ability will be selected. A relevant exception may occur if the first best is the overall best candidate. First best selection is always achieved if the committee is anonymous to the candidates. If the committee is not detached enough from the candidates then delegation fares even worse than random selection.