Action and Variation in Perception. (22nd February 2017)

• Record Type: Journal Article
• Authors: Laasik, Kristjan
• Is Part Of: European journal of philosophy. Volume 25:Number 4(2017:Dec.)
• Page Start: 1364
• Page End: 1375
• Publication Date: 2017-02-22
• Subjects: Philosophy -- Periodicals; Philosophy, European -- Periodicals; Philosophy, Modern -- 20th century -- Periodicals; 190
• DOI: 10.1111/ejop.12216
• Languages: English
• ISSNs: 0966-8373

Abstract

Abstract: In her paper, 'Action and Self‐location in Perception', Susanna Schellenberg argues that perceptual experience of an object's intrinsic spatial properties, such as its size and shape, requires a capacity to act. More specifically, Schellenberg argues that, to have a perceptual experience of an object's intrinsic spatial properties, a subject needs to have a certain practical conception of space, or a spatial know‐how. That, in turn, requires self‐locating representations, which locate the subject, relative to the perceptual object, as a perceiver and an agent, viz., someone who has a capacity for actions. She also makes two objections, viz., the unification objection and the sentient statue objection, to Alva Noë's sensorimotor view, a different account of how perceptual experience depends on actions. I will argue that her objections jointly render problematic not only Noë's but also her own view.