Rational secret sharing with semi-rational players. (2nd March 2012)

• Record Type: Journal Article
• Authors: Wang, Yilei; Wang, Hao; Xu, Qiuliang
• Is Part Of: International journal of grid and utility computing. Volume 3:Number 1(2012)
• Page Start: 59
• Page End: 67
• Publication Date: 2012-03-02
• Subjects: game theory -- Nash equilibrium -- rational secret sharing -- point-to-point networks; Electronic data processing -- Distributed processing -- Periodicals; Electronic commerce -- Management -- Computer programs -- Periodicals; 004.605
• Languages: English
• ISSNs: 1741-847X

Abstract

Rational secret sharing, first introduced by Halpern and Teague, means that whether players send their shares relies on their utilities, whereas in traditional scheme, players are assumed to contribute their shares willingly. This paper puts forward a rational secret-sharing scheme where players run their reconstruction protocol in point-to-point communication networks other than broadcast channels which are often used in previous papers. Kol and Naor propose an efficient t -out-of- n protocol for rational secret sharing without using cryptographic primitives while it has weak robustness to coalition when short player colludes with any long players. The protocol proposed by Fuchsbauer and Katz runs efficiently in asynchronous or point-to-point networks. Although it achieves strict Nash equilibrium and is stable with respect to trembles, it is susceptible to realise fairness among the whole party. This paper proposes a rational secret-sharing scheme in point-to-point communication networks to achieve fairness and robustness to coalition.