Action explanation and its presuppositions. Issue 1 (2nd January 2019)

• Record Type: Journal Article
• Authors: O'Brien, Lilian
• Is Part Of: Canadian journal of philosophy. Volume 49:Issue 1(2019)
• Page Start: 123
• Page End: 146
• Publication Date: 2019-01-02
• Subjects: Rationalizing action explanation -- reasons explanation -- causalism -- Davidson's challenge; Philosophy -- Periodicals; 105
• DOI: 10.1080/00455091.2018.1518629
• Languages: English
• ISSNs: 0045-5091

Abstract

ABSTRACT: In debates about rationalizing action explanation causalists assume that the psychological states that explain an intentional action have both causal and rational features. I scrutinize the presuppositions of those who seek and offer rationalizing action explanations. This scrutiny shows, I argue, that where rational features play an explanatory role in these contexts, causal features play only a presuppositional role. But causal features would have to play an explanatory role if rationalizing action explanation were a species of causal explanation. Consequently, it is not a species of causal explanation.