Why C-luck really is a problem for compatibilism. Issue 1 (2nd January 2019)

• Record Type: Journal Article
• Authors: Schoonover, S. B.; Guajardo, Ivan
• Is Part Of: Canadian journal of philosophy. Volume 49:Issue 1(2019)
• Page Start: 48
• Page End: 69
• Publication Date: 2019-01-02
• Subjects: Luck -- compatibilism -- moral responsibility -- decision-biases -- nudging -- reasons-responsivity; Philosophy -- Periodicals; 105
• DOI: 10.1080/00455091.2018.1531464
• Languages: English
• ISSNs: 0045-5091

Abstract

ABSTRACT: Some philosophers have recently argued that luck at the time of decision is a problem for compatibilists and libertarians alike. But conceptual ambiguity regarding deterministic luck at the time of decision – henceforth C-luck – has obscured recognition of the problem C-luck poses to compatibilism. This paper clarifies C-luck and distinguishes it from present luck, showing that the former arises from contingent factors at the time of decision instead of presupposed free will requirements. We then argue that empirical findings confirm the existence of C-luck thereby raising a fundamental challenge to compatibilist accounts of moral responsibility.