How do supreme audit institutions manage their autonomy and impact? A comparative analysis. Issue 2 (1st February 2019)

• Record Type: Journal Article
• Authors: Pierre, Jon; de Fine Licht, Jenny
• Is Part Of: Journal of European public policy. Volume 26:Issue 2(2019)
• Page Start: 226
• Page End: 245
• Publication Date: 2019-02-01
• Subjects: Auditing -- autonomy -- regulatory capture -- reform advocacy -- SAI -- supreme audit institution; European Union countries -- Politics and government -- Periodicals; Political planning -- European Union countries -- Periodicals; Politique publique -- Pays de l'Union européenne -- Périodiques; Pays de l'Union européenne -- Politique et gouvernement -- Périodiques; 361.61094
• DOI: 10.1080/13501763.2017.1408669
• Languages: English
• ISSNs: 1350-1763

Abstract

ABSTRACT: Supreme audit institutions (SAIs) are gradually becoming important agents of public management reform; a development raising issues of autonomy and potential capture by auditees as well as by the political system. Drawing on exploratory case studies of the rules and strategies of four high-performing SAIs – those of Australia, New Zealand, Norway and Sweden – the article shows that SAIs have different approaches to the balance between autonomy and impact. These results imply that there is not only one way of organizing an efficient and autonomous SAI, but that different positions can prove viable.