A dynamic model of optimal reduction of marine oil pollution. (29th October 2004)

• Record Type: Journal Article
• Authors: Deissenberg, Christophe; Gottinger, Hans; Gurman, Vladimir; Marinushkin, Dmitry
• Is Part Of: International journal of environment and pollution. Volume 15:Number 3(2001)
• Page Start: 322
• Page End: 332
• Publication Date: 2004-10-29
• Subjects: optimisation -- protection cost -- shadow relations -- social damage -- environmental pollution -- marine pollution -- oil pollution -- oil spills; Environmental policy -- Periodicals; Environmental engineering -- Periodicals; Environmental sciences -- Periodicals; Pollution -- Periodicals; 363.73
• Languages: English
• ISSNs: 0957-4352

Abstract

This paper proposes a system of dynamic models to describe the interactive behaviour of different agents (polluters, inspectors, and a principal pollution control agency) involved in the processes of marine oil pollution and of its prevention and purification, under some realistic assumptions. In particular, short- and long-term economic responses of polluters to monitoring efforts, as well as possible collusions between polluters and inspectors, are taken into account. A numerical example is considered using the results of Deissenberg et al., (2001a), which show the existence of optimal fines and inspector wage rates that minimise (along with other variables) a simple and visual "social damage" criterion.