On Anger, Silence, and Epistemic Injustice. (13th November 2018)

• Record Type: Journal Article
• Authors: Bailey, Alison
• Is Part Of: Royal Institute of Philosophy supplement. Volume 84(2018)
• Page Start: 93
• Page End: 115
• Publication Date: 2018-11-13
• Subjects: Philosophy -- Periodicals; 100
• DOI: 10.1017/S1358246118000565
• Languages: English
• ISSNs: 1358-2461

Abstract

Abstract: If anger is the emotion of injustice, and if most injustices have prominent epistemic dimensions, then where is the anger in epistemic injustice? Despite the question my task is not to account for the lack of attention to anger in epistemic injustice discussions. Instead, I argue that a particular texture of transformative anger – a knowing resistant anger – offers marginalized knowers a powerful resource for countering epistemic injustice. I begin by making visible the anger that saturates the silences that epistemic injustices repeatedly manufacture and explain the obvious: silencing practices produce angry experiences. I focus on tone policing and tone vigilance to illustrate the relationship between silencing and angry knowledge management. Next, I use María Lugones's pluralist account of anger to bring out the epistemic dimensions of knowing resistant anger in a way that also calls attention to their histories and felt textures. The final section draws on feminist scholarship about the transformative power of angry knowledge to suggest how it might serve as a resource for resisting epistemic injustice.