How it makes a moral difference that one is worse off than one could have been. (May 2018)

• Record Type: Journal Article
• Authors: Otsuka, Michael
• Is Part Of: Politics, philosophy & economics. Volume 17:Number 2(2018)
• Page Start: 192
• Page End: 215
• Publication Date: 2018-05
• Subjects: contractualism -- consequentialism -- complaints -- non-identity problem -- Parfit -- no difference view; Social sciences and ethics -- Periodicals; Philosophy and social sciences -- Periodicals; 320.05
• DOI: 10.1177/1470594X17731394
• Languages: English
• ISSNs: 1470-594X

Abstract

In this article, I argue that it makes a moral difference whether an individual is worse off than she could have been. Here, I part company with consequentialists such as Parfit and side with contractualists such as Scanlon. But, unlike some contractualists, I reject the view that all that matters is whether a principle can be justified to each particular individual, where such a justification is attentive to her interests, complaints and other claims. The anonymous goodness of a distribution also matters. My attempt to reconcile contractualist and consequentialist approaches proceeds via a serious of reflections on cases.