Object reidentification and the epistemic role of attention. (5th October 2018)

• Record Type: Journal Article
• Authors: Das, Nilanjan
• Other Names: Sinha Shalini guestEditor.
• Is Part Of: Ratio. Volume 31:Number 4(2018:Dec.)
• Page Start: 402
• Page End: 414
• Publication Date: 2018-10-05
• Subjects: attention -- Buddhism -- Nyāya -- object reidentification -- scepticism; Philosophy -- Periodicals; Analysis (Philosophy) -- Periodicals; 105
• DOI: 10.1111/rati.12214
• Languages: English
• ISSNs: 0034-0006

Abstract

Abstract: Reidentification scepticism is the view that we cannot knowledgeably reidentify previously perceived objects. Amongst classical Indian philosophers, the Buddhists argued for reidentification scepticism. In this essay, I will discuss two responses to this Buddhist argument. The first response, defended by Vācaspati Miśra (9th century CE), is that our outer senses allow us to knowledgeably reidentify objects. I will claim that this proposal is problematic. The second response, due to Jayanta Bhaṭṭa (9th century CE), is that the manas or the inner sense, functioning as a capacity of attention, helps us knowledgeably reidentify objects. I will explain how this second response answers the Buddhists' challenge.