Consciousness and no self?. (22nd October 2018)

• Record Type: Journal Article
• Authors: Watzl, Sebastian
• Other Names: Sinha Shalini guestEditor.
• Is Part Of: Ratio. Volume 31:Number 4(2018:Dec.)
• Page Start: 363
• Page End: 375
• Publication Date: 2018-10-22
• Subjects: attention -- consciousness -- distraction -- no‐self -- self -- transparency; Philosophy -- Periodicals; Analysis (Philosophy) -- Periodicals; 105
• DOI: 10.1111/rati.12216
• Languages: English
• ISSNs: 0034-0006

Abstract

Abstract: Phenomenal consciousness, what it is like for each particular subject, seems to be at the heart of subjectivity and the primary home of the self. But is there in fact a role for the self in phenomenal consciousness? According to the phenomenal no‐self challenge, reflection on the character of phenomenal consciousness reveals no self and no subjectivity. I articulate an argument for this challenge based on the transparency of conscious experience. I then respond to this argument and show that there is an aspect of phenomenal consciousness that the challengers miss. This aspect is active attention. In active attention, in particular in the ability to actively resist distractions, consciousness reveals an agential self: the experiencer is phenomenally manifest as an active power. I further show that the subject's active role in experience is plausibly present in every form of experience.