Why a modular approach to reason?. (22nd August 2018)

• Record Type: Journal Article
• Authors: Sperber, Dan; Mercier, Hugo
• Is Part Of: Mind & language. Volume 33:Number 5(2018:Nov.)
• Page Start: 533
• Page End: 541
• Publication Date: 2018-08-22
• Subjects: inference -- metacognition -- metarepresentation -- modularity -- reasoning; Psycholinguistics -- Periodicals; Thought and thinking -- Periodicals; Language and languages -- Philosophy -- Periodicals; 153.42
• DOI: 10.1111/mila.12208
• Languages: English
• ISSNs: 0268-1064

Abstract

Abstract : In their reviews, Chater and Oaksford, Dutilh Novaes, and Sterelny are critical of our modularist approach to reason. In this response, we clarify our claim that reason is one of many cognitive modules that produce intuitive inferences each in its domain; the reason module producing intuitions about reasons. We argue that in‐principle objections to the idea of massive modularity based on Fodor's peculiar approach are not effective against other interpretations that have led to insightful uses of the notion in psychology and biology. We explain how the reason module evaluates reasons on the basis of their metacognitive properties. We show how the module fulfils a social function, that of producing reasons to justify oneself and convince others and of evaluating the reasons others produce to convince us.