Darwinism and Human Dignity. (1st February 2007)

• Record Type: Journal Article
• Authors: Dixon, Ben
• Is Part Of: Environmental values. Volume 16:Number 1(2007:Spring)
• Page Start: 23
• Page End: 42
• Publication Date: 2007-02-01
• Subjects: Environmental ethics -- Periodicals; Environmental policy -- Periodicals; 179.105
• DOI: 10.3197/096327107780160300
• Languages: English
• ISSNs: 0963-2719

Abstract

James Rachels argued against the possibility of finding some moral capacity in humans that confers upon them a unique dignity. His argument contends that Darwinism challenges such attempts, because Darwinism predicts that any morally valuable capacity able to bestow a unique dignity is likely present to a degree within both humans and non-human animals alike. I make the case, however, that some of Darwin's own thoughts regarding the nature of conscience provide a springboard for criticising Rachels's claim here. Using Darwin's thoughts regarding conscience, I begin the project of grounding a revised account of human dignity in the human tendency to enshrine products of conscience within institutions. Specifically, I argue that this new account of human dignity is partly contingent upon humans creating institutions morally respectful of the values present within non-human nature.